Overview and synthesis (2004)
Abstract
Untersuchung von Kooperation anhand von Sozialen Normen und Werten.\nDazu werden Ultimatum-, Prisoner- und Kollektivgutprobleme gespielt.\nDies finden in verschiedenen abgeschnittenen Regionen statt. Ergebnisse\n: Regionale Unterschiede im Ultimatumspiel sehr gro{ß} (Da dieses\ndas mit den den h{ö}chsten Fairnessnormen ist).
Bibliographic entry
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C. F., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., [et-al] (2004). Overview and synthesis. In J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, & H. Gintis (Eds.), Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies (pp. 8-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miscellaneous
| Publication year | 2004 | |
|---|---|---|
| Document type: | In book | |
| Publication status: | Published | |
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| Keywords: | behavioural differencescross-cultural behaviourcross-cultural studydictator gameeconomic interactionseconomics experimentsecuadoreveryday lifeexperimental behaviourhuman behaviourindonesiakenyalocal group effectsmongoliapapua new guineaparaguaypatterns of interactionperupublic goods gameself-interestsocial interactionstanzaniaultimatum gamevariation between groupszimbabwe |