Simplifying Bayesian inference: The general case (1999)
Authors
Abstract
(from the chapter) Presents empirical evidence that human reasoning follows the rules of probability theory, if information is presented in "natural formats". Human reasoning has often been evaluated in terms of humans' ability to deal with probabilities. Yet, in nature we do not observe probabilities, we rather count samples and their subsets. The authors' concept of Markov frequencies generalizes G. Gigerenzer and U. Hoffrage's (see record 1996-10283-001) "natural frequencies", which are known to foster insight in Bayesian situations with one cue. Markov frequencies allow the visualization of Bayesian inference problems even with an arbitrary number of cues. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2000 APA, all rights reserved)
Bibliographic entry
Krauss, S., Martignon, L., & Hoffrage, U. (1999). Simplifying Bayesian inference: The general case. In L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian, & P. Thagard (Eds.), Model-based reasoning in scientific discovery (pp. 165-179). New York: Kluwer. (Full text)
Miscellaneous
| Publication year | 1999 | |
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| Document type: | In book | |
| Publication status: | Published | |
| External URL: | http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/institut/dok/full/martignon/kssbimbri/kssbimbri.html View | |
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