Gigerenzer,G.
Hoffrage,U.

Comments on an article by Aron K. Barbey and Steven A. Sloman (see record 2007-18575-001). The terms nested sets, partitive frequencies, inside-outside view, and dual processes add little but confusion to our original analysis (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995; 1999). The idea of nested set was introduced because of an oversight; it simply rephrases two of our equations. Representation in terms of chances, in contrast, is a novel contribution yet consistent with our computational analysis - it uses exactly the same numbers as natural frequencies. We show that non-Bayesian reasoning in children, laypeople, and physicians follows multiple rules rather than a general-purpose associative process in a vaguely specified "System 1." It is unclear what the theory in "dual process theory" is: Unless the two processes are defined, this distinction can account post hoc for almost everything. In contrast, an ecological view of cognition helps to explain how insight is elicited from the outside (the external representation of information) and, more generally, how cognitive strategies match with environmental structures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved)

Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (2007). The role of representation in Bayesian reasoning: Correcting common misconceptions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 264-267. (Full text)

Publication year	2007
Document type:	Article
Publication status:	Published
External URL:	http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/gg/GG_Role_2007.pdf View
Categories:	Environment StructureProbability
Keywords:	cognitive processesdecision makingbase-rate neglectjudgmentrationalityuncertainty