Zhu,L.
Gigerenzer,G.
Huangfu,G.

Can traces of rapid socio-economic changes within a society be reflected in experimental games? The post-Mao reforms in China provide a unique natural quasi-experiment to study people from the same society who were raised with radically different values about distribution of wealth and altruistic behavior. We tested whether the size of offers in the ultimatum and dictator games are an increasing function of the number of years Chinese citizens experienced of the Mao era ("planned economy"). For the cohort that lived throughout the entire Mao era, we found that mean offers in the two games were substantially higher than what is typically offered in laboratory studies. These offers were also higher than those of two younger Chinese cohorts. In general, the amount offered decreased with less time spent under Mao, while in the oldest group in which every member spent the same amount of time under Mao, the younger members tended to offer more, suggesting an additional effect of early education under Mao and contradicting the alternative hypothesis that generosity increases with age. These results suggest that some of the observed individual differences in the offers made in experimental games can be traced back to the values of the socio-economic era in which individuals grew up.

Zhu, L., Gigerenzer, G., & Huangfu, G. (2013). Psychological traces of China's socio-economic reforms in the ultimatum and dictator games. PLoS ONE, 8(8): e70769. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070769 (Full text)

Publication year	2013
Document type:	Article
Publication status:	Published
External URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0070769 View
Categories:	Experimental GamesEducationEconomic Behavior
Keywords: