Bounded rationality (2009)
Authors
Abstract
Humans and other animals must make inferences about unknown features of their world under constraints of limited time, knowledge, and computational capacities. We do not conceive bounded rationality as optimization under constraints nor do we think of bounded rational- ity as the study of how people fail to meet normative ideals. Rather, bounded rationality is the key to understanding how people make decisions without utilities and probabilities. Bounded rationality consists of simple step-by-step rules that function well under the constraints of limited search, knowledge, and time—whether an optimal procedure is available or not. Just as a mechanic will pull out specifi c wrenches, pliers, and gap gauges to maintain an engine rather than just hit everything with a hammer, different tasks require different specialized tools. The notion of a toolbox full of unique single-function devices lacks the beauty of Leibniz’ dream of a single all-purpose inferential power tool. Instead, it evokes the abilities of a craftsman, who can provide serviceable solutions to almost any problem with just what is at hand.
Bibliographic entry
Gigerenzer, G. (2009). Bounded rationality. In D. Sander & K. R. Scherer (Eds.), The Oxford companion to emotion and the affective sciences (pp. 79-80). New York: Oxford University Press. (Full text)
Miscellaneous
| Publication year | 2009 | |
|---|---|---|
| Document type: | In book | |
| Publication status: | Published | |
| External URL: | http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/gg/GG_Bounded_2009.pdf View | |
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